

Excerpt from Senate debate of
S. 2248, DOD Authorization
for FY 83, which passed
Senate on 13 May 1982.

who is doing it, what is being done,
& the situation.

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(1) A detailed evaluation of the study's findings, conclusions, and recommendations;
 (2) The views of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the "Vista 1999" study;
 (3) Any plans and recommendations for implementation of the contents of the "Vista 1999" study.

(b) This report shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate no later than February 1, 1983.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would require a study by the Secretary of Defense of the recent report of the "Vista 1999" task force which was a group of senior Army and Air National Guard adjutants generals, general officers, and commanders. These individuals took a long term, no-holds-barred look at the scope, size, nature, and methods of operations for what they considered the appropriate ways for the Army and Air National Guard to fulfill their constitutional and statutory responsibilities for the security of the Nation through the year 1999.

In its report entitled "Vista 1999, A Long-Range Look at the Future of the Army and Air National Guard," the task force made a number of findings and recommendations which bear serious review.

I am offering an amendment which will require a high-level focus by the Secretary of Defense on this substantive and provocative report. The amendment will require a study and evaluation by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau with a report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on their views.

Congressman NEWT GINGRICH has introduced a similar amendment on the House side and in fact brought this amendment to my attention. I commend him for this leadership in this effort and am pleased to offer a companion, although not identical, amendment in the Senate side.

I hope the chairman and the ranking minority member will accept this amendment.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator enlighten me a little further on what the objective of the study is?

Mr. NUNN. To require high-level focus in the Department of Defense on a very important study into the Army and Air National Guard, which really affects the whole posture of the Guard for the next 20 years.

As the chairman knows, many times what the Guard recommends is ignored, and this would require high-level focus and reaction by the Secretary of Defense on what is a very substantive report.

Mr. TOWER. Does this have to do with the Guard's equipment?

Mr. NUNN. The whole gamut of the Guard's role—tactics, mission. It is a whole look at what the Guard's position is in the national security picture.

Mr. TOWER. This is the Guard and the Reserve?

Mr. NUNN. This is primarily the Guard. It addresses some Reserve issues but is primarily the Guard.

Mr. TOWER. Is it something to the effect of how they fit into the total force concept?

Mr. NUNN. That is right, and what role they should be playing in the future. It makes some thought provoking suggestions. I believe it should be looked at very high up in the Defense Department.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I should like to support the amendment.

Mr. TOWER. If my distinguished friend from Mississippi is prepared to support it, I can hardly do otherwise. I am prepared to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (UP No. 954) was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment of the Senator from Oregon be temporarily laid aside; that the Senator from Georgia may offer an amendment; that upon the disposition of the amendment of the Senator from Georgia, the Senate return to the considerations of the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 955

(Purpose: An amendment to evaluate arms control initiatives to include military crisis control center and hotline enhancements.)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN), for himself, Mr. WARNER, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. BURDICK, and Mr. CHILES, proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 955.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following section:

SEC. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a full and complete study and evaluation of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in crises. Such study and evaluation shall include but not be limited to the following initiatives:

(1) establishment of a multi-national military crises control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

(2) development of a forum for joint U.S./U.S.S.R. sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and

(3) development of U.S./U.S.S.R. confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

(A) an improved U.S./U.S.S.R. communications hotline for crisis control;

(B) enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

(C) measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

(D) measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

(a) this report shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the House and Senate by August 1, 1982 and should be available in both a classified, if necessary, and unclassified format.

(b) the President shall report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations one month later on September 1, 1982 on the merits of such initiatives developed in section (a) to the arms control process and on the status of any such initiative as they may relate to any arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am sponsoring this amendment and the cosponsors are Senators WARNER, JACKSON, DURENBERGER, MITCHELL, CRANSTON, BURDICK, and CHILES.

Mr. President, in all of the current focus on nuclear freezes, "no first use" and arms control policies in general, there is an extremely important element missing—the need to deal constructively with the prospect of a nuclear war triggered by a third country or terrorist group. No change in NATO's nuclear doctrine and none of the freeze proposals would decrease or prevent the chances of such a catastrophe. An accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation should be of mutual concern to the two superpowers.

I have been concerned about the potential of an accidental nuclear exchange between the two superpowers for some time. On March 10, 1981, I wrote the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Richard Ellis, and asked SAC, as the premier defense command in nuclear matters, to analyze the potential for this type of exchange and to recommend some initiatives for dealing with the problem. General Ellis is now retired and serving as the U.S. representative on the Standing Consultative Committee and is one of the most thorough and knowledgeable military men in the arms control area as well as an expert in nuclear policies and weapons.

I outlined my belief that our strategic arms control efforts have for some time concentrated almost exclusively on the number of launchers and warheads and the "bolt from the blue" premeditated strategic strike. While I certainly agree with the importance of this focus and these negotiations, I feel that we should also begin to think seriously about what could be more likely catalysts which could lead to nuclear war. There are many factors that need assessment as to how the U.S./U.S.S.R. would interact at the strategic level in times of crises and conflict.

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For example, a disguised third country attack on one of the superpowers could precipitate a United States/Soviet nuclear exchange.

I asked General Ellis to examine four key areas in his study as follows:

First. Is our communications, command, and control capable of discerning the source of attack under this type scenario?

Second. What capabilities do the Soviets have in this respect (warning and threat assessment)?

Third. What other scenarios should be considered in terms of U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic interaction in periods of crises and conflict?

Fourth. Are there arms control innovations and initiatives that can be proposed in this general area as well as the overall C-3/connectivity area?

General Ellis established a study group that spent many months working on these issues, and in July of that same year I went to SAC in Omaha to discuss the results of their study.

Mr. President, I believe that their conclusions are even more relevant today, and I hope that the members of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee at some point will be briefed on this classified information.

In brief, in an unclassified way, the SAC analysis showed that the United States and the Soviets must dramatically improve their warning and attack characterization to deal with the use of a nuclear device by a third party in either peacetime or a crisis situation.

To be able to detect the origin of a nuclear attack is all important for the superpowers, both superpowers, if we are going to avoid and hopefully prevent that kind of situation from developing.

The SAC analysis dealt with the potential third party threat by examining the various unconventional delivery systems that could be utilized to explode such a device on United States or Soviet soil.

SAC also identified many unconventional methods of delivery other than the normally discussed platforms such as fighter planes, missiles or bombers that a Third World nation might utilize.

Mr. President, by the end of the decade over 20 nations will have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons, and the possibility of possession of these weapons by terrorists cannot be dismissed.

Mr. President, I am convinced that both the United States and Russia have a common and mutual interest in preventing such a Third World trigger or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that both nations have a mutual interest in working together to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a third country or from a terrorist attack. I am convinced that arms control efforts can be made relevant to the growing danger of this type of a nuclear catalyst.

Everyone now seems to be in search of an easy solution in the arms control area, but there are no nuclear quick fixes. What we can begin to do jointly with the Soviet Union is to build a capability and mutual trust to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation. This step could add a strong element of deterrence to any party contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of provoking a confrontation between the superpowers.

For this reason, Mr. President, I am proposing this amendment to the fiscal year 1983 defense authorization bill directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct a full and complete study of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons including:

First, establishment of a multinational military crisis control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

Second, development of a forum for joint U.S./U.S.S.R. sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and

Third, development of U.S./U.S.S.R. confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

An improved U.S./U.S.S.R. communications hotline for crisis control;

Enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

Measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

Measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

This study and report would be provided to the Congress by August 1, 1982, and I would further require that the President review the results of the DOD analysis and submit to the Congress within a month his views on the merits of the proposals and their relevance to U.S. arms control policies and proposals.

Mr. President, I believe this amendment will provide a sound analytical framework for the key agencies in our Government and the public to deal with the issue of accidental nuclear war. There has been very little work done in this area other than the pioneer study by SAC under General Ellis' direction.

This amendment will also serve to focus attention on this important element of the nuclear issue which is missing in the current debate and discussion and which is a more likely contingency, in my view, than a premeditated nuclear attack or "bolt out of the blue."

Mr. President, I hope that this amendment will be acceptable to the Senate.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, after discussing the matter with the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, I have arrived at the conclusion that it is a good amendment, and I am pre-

pared to accept it on behalf of the majority.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think it has good possibilities, also, and we will have a better chance before conference and at conference to really consider it than we do here this morning.

So I hope we take it.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the chairman and the ranking minority member.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Georgia.

The amendment (UP No. 955) was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment of the Senator from Oregon be temporarily laid aside to permit the Senator from Michigan to offer an amendment and on the disposition of the amendment of the Senator from Michigan return to the consideration of the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 956

(Purpose: To establish a procedure for increased legislative oversight of increases in costs of acquisition of certain major defense systems)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN), for himself, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, and Mr. EAGLETON, proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 956.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

ANALYSIS OF REPORTS ON UNIT COSTS OF MAJOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

SEC. (a) At the same time that the Secretary concerned transmits to the Congress any report under section 1103(b)(3) of this Act or any certification under section 1103(c)(2)(b) of this Act, the Secretary concerned shall transmit a copy of such report or certification to the Comptroller General of the United States (hereafter in this section referred to as the "Comptroller General").

(b)(1) Not later than 45 days after the date on which the Secretary concerned transmits under subsection (a) a copy of any report or certification referred to in such subsection, the Comptroller General shall review and analyze such report or certification and transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a written report on such review and analysis. Where applicable, the report by the Comptroller General shall include his opinion on—